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a ‘negotiation across the threshold of an outline’.3 
Despite the specificity of any shape or figure, 
outline or boundary, Bateson’s metalogue indi-
cates that form can be taken for something that is 
essentially unattainable. In this sense, to ask ‘what 
is form?’ implies a generalisation, which neces-
sarily dismisses or neglects certain often important 
aspects.
This sort of generalisation is quite common 
among architects, as architectural historian Adrian 
Forty reveals in his critical dictionary of architectural 
modernism. Forty argues that the Western notion 
of form in architecture ‘appears to have outlived its 
usefulness’ and claims that the term ‘has become 
frozen, no longer in active development, and with 
little curiosity as to what purposes it might serve’.4 
Forty further suggests that its ambiguity (at least in 
the English language) is at least partially to blame.5 
Form, he notes, stands for shape, but it also stands 
for the idea or essence behind that shape. These 
two different interpretations alternate between form 
understood as a mental construct, and form under-
stood as the way an object or substance is perceived 
by the senses.6 In his opinion, what we know as the 
form-function paradigm, or the modernist belief that 
a univocal relation exists between the materialised 
shape of a building and the idealised human actions 
meant to take place within it, benefitted from (or fell 
victim to) this ambiguity.7
Granted that most functionalist propositions 
have been broadly rejected, Forty points out that 
Daughter: Daddy, why do things have outlines?
Father: Do they? I don’t know. What sort of things 
you mean?
D: I mean when I draw things, why do they have  
 outlines?
F: Well, what about other sorts of things – a flock of  
 sheep? Or a conversation? Do they   
 have outlines?
D: Don’t be silly. I can’t draw a conversation. I   
 mean things.
F: Yes – I was trying to find out just what you   
 meant. Do you mean ‘why do we give things  
 outlines when we draw them?’ or do you mean  
 that the things have outlines whether we draw  
 them or not?
D: I don’t know, Daddy. You tell me. Which do I  
 mean? (Bateson, 1972)1
This is how anthropologist Gregory Bateson opens 
one of the dialogues – or, as he calls them, ‘meta-
logues’ – in his book Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 
Extracted from the metalogue ‘Why do Things Have 
Outlines?’ the above conversation between Bateson 
and his daughter suggests that an outline can be 
understood ‘as a threshold between disciplines; 
between things; between organisms and their 
environments, and importantly, how this threshold 
always needs to be tested.’2 Not surprisingly, father 
and daughter cannot decide whether outlines are 
constructed or come in advance, whether they actu-
ally define the shape of a thing, or appear to do 
so only to our senses. Instead, Bateson invites us 
to assume that the shape of things comes out of 
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2based on a modernist definition, or disqualifying 
a particular kind of formalism as ‘poor’, is simply 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, we 
believe that a syncretic approach to formalism – one 
that is able to account simultaneously for architec-
ture and for its effects by establishing transversal 
relations among several formalisms – should effec-
tively improve on modernist dichotomies, as well as 
on postmodern claims for the autonomy of form. 
It was based on this belief that we set out to 
explore current formal studies in architecture in the 
first place, echoing Mitchell’s plea for an under-
standing of form as something that ‘is not made but 
found, not constructed voluntarily but discovered as 
something we were already committed to without 
being aware of it’.13 As a result, the reflections 
collected in this issue elaborate on that commit-
ment, and reveal that the study of architectural form 
is – contrary to Forty’s interpretation – everything 
but frozen, evolving quite actively, and serving an 
important purpose. 
It is clear to us that the following contributions 
proliferate beyond the aforementioned elemental 
question ‘what is form?’ with a host of additional 
questions, such as ‘how is form? when or where is 
form? for whom, why and for what purpose?’ This 
multiplication of the variables involved in the study 
of form suggests a shared attempt to provide us 
with an updated and valuable knowledge of not just 
one generalising aspect of form, but instead of the 
many variables that make architectural form and its 
studies subject to change. 
Furthermore, this shared attempt appears to be 
aligned with our original decision as editors to follow 
a tripartite trajectory regarding formal studies, which 
included at least three different and rather popular 
perspectives. On the one hand, we invited archi-
tects to reflect on the way built form is produced, 
how it comes into being. On the other, we encour-
aged the study of the ways in which architectural 
we should be suspicious of the apparent normalcy 
with which we continue talking about architec-
tural form these days. Instead, he says, we must 
remain aware that form, as any other word, is 
always and only a device for thought.8 His argu-
ment seems almost self-evident. As media theorist 
W.J.T. Mitchell mentions in a somewhat playful 
tone, everyone knows that the concept of form has 
outlived its usefulness.9 Much more interesting, 
though, is the fact that this assumption (of the trite-
ness or the banality of form) says much more about 
the epistemologies that developed around a very 
limited understanding of form, than about form itself. 
In other words, if we follow Mitchell’s interpretation, 
we can only conclude that Forty’s thoughts are not 
really focused on form, but on formalism. 
Architectural theorist Sanford Kwinter has 
elaborated on this distinction between form and 
formalism, concluding that that there is not really 
one, unitary and universal kind of formalism, 
but several different formalisms.10 Common 
among these formalisms – he says – are what he 
describes as poor and true formalisms. In Kwinter’s 
opinion, the poverty of ‘what is today collectively 
referred to by the misnomer formalism is more than 
anything else the result of a sloppy conflation of 
the notion of form with that of object’.11 While this 
so-called poor formalism deals with the examina-
tion of fixed objects, Kwinter describes another kind 
of formalism – which he dubs ‘true’ – in relation 
to processes of formation, understanding form as 
an ordering action.12 This means that rather than 
providing a generic account of objects (as typolo-
gies, classifications, and so on), Kwinter aims for 
a genetic account of how those objects come into 
being in the way that they do.
As editors of this issue of Footprint, we share both 
Forty’s position regarding the paucity of modernist 
definitions of form, and Kwinter’s urge to radically 
update our epistemologies. However, it is also clear 
to us that disregarding form as an obsolete concept 
3Along this threshold, it is clear to us that the 
following contributions tend to transverse several 
kinds of formalisms based on a common denomi-
nator. The reflections collected here coincide in 
understanding contemporary culture and archi-
tecture as reciprocally constitutive, and therefore 
complex, intense and heterogeneous. The preva-
lence of this understanding, and the subsequent 
belief that the process of determining, producing 
or appropriating built form must necessarily reflect 
these traits, has two interesting consequences. 
First, it is clear that some of the following 
approaches to form aim for complexity in abstract 
terms.15 The radical break with the more generic 
strains of formalism suggested by this abstrac-
tion implies an intentional dismissal of a specific, 
object-centred, formalist tradition – if we are to 
follow Kwinter’s suggestion. In addition, it reso-
nates with Mitchell’s plea that a commitment to form 
‘will require not simply returning to the concepts of 
form and formalism of yester-year or restarting old 
commitments. It will necessitate a rethinking of both 
terms and of the relation between them.’16 
A second consequence of this under-
standing – also connected with Mitchell’s plea – is 
clear in another set of texts, which still try to estab-
lish transversal connections between the more 
generic formalisms, and other kinds of formalism. 
These transversal connections explain why these 
contemporary studies on architectural form seem 
able to leave unproductive dichotomies – such as 
poor and true formalisms, or generic and genetic 
formalisms – behind. 
We would like to underscore the importance of this 
supersession, convinced as we are that it is beyond 
these binaries where form mostly lies: active, full 
of potentials and agency, not to be approached in 
terms of what it is but in terms of what it can do. Said 
differently, we strongly believe that the crucial issue 
when it comes to architectural form is not to properly 
form appears in discursive or communicative terms. 
Finally, we embraced inquiries into the different 
relations that can be established between human 
actions, understood in the broadest possible terms, 
and the shape of the built environment. By interre-
lating these three approaches, we aimed to embrace 
and braid object-based approaches to form, 
approaches that examine the reciprocity of formal 
emergence, and studies dealing with in-formation. 
Emulating Joseph Kosuth’s well-known triptychs, 
our aim was to situate the question of architectural 
form between these three topical interpretations, 
which we referred to as architecture’s configurative 
triad.
Still, we set out to survey this configurative triad 
departing from a concrete historical landmark that 
surpasses the form-function paradigm that Forty 
found so problematic. This landmark – not without 
its own problems – was the emergence of neo-
rationalism in the early 1960s, as a direct reaction 
to modernist functionalism.14 Our aim with this 
choice was to recognise the weight of form-centred 
theories in postmodern architectural research; and 
although we felt that that landmark was meant to 
be superseded, we did not foresee the nature of 
that supersession, much less realise the extent to 
which it appears to be consummated. 
Giovanni Corbellini’s review article – the only 
that actually addressed the neo-rationalist tradi-
tion – does so tangentially, by focusing on an 
important though lesser known figure among the 
architects of the well-known ‘Tendenza’ group. 
Based on the work of Gianugo Polesello, Corbellini 
describes the complex exchanges that character-
ised the group’s activity, rather than focusing on 
the specificity of their theories. In this sense, his 
approach to one of the centres of neo-rationalist 
architectural thinking somehow sets the tone for the 
whole issue: a tone of negotiation and nuance, acting 
on what Bateson would describe as the ‘threshold 
of the outline’ of architectural communication. 
4Introducing yet another line of thought, Stylianos 
Giamarelos discusses the possibility of revising the 
formalist bases of Colin Rowe’s analytical theory. 
His aim is to make that theory operative in an age 
where – as Luca Di Lorenzo makes clear in his 
review article – our current understanding of form 
is best explained in relation to computing systems’ 
software, interfaces, and hardware, as well as their 
interaction. In other words, both Giamarelos and Di 
Lorenzo address a timely contemporary concern: 
‘for whom is architectural form nowadays?’ 
Embracing most of the questions above, Lars 
Spuybroek suggests that, historically, form has 
always been able to account for the complexity, 
intensity, and heterogeneity we appear to be so 
eager to capture. More than software and hard-
ware, more than any type of formalism, more than 
an historic account of any built form, Spuybroek 
notes that our relation to form can be understood 
as the interrelation between an object and the acts 
of giving, receiving and returning that object.17 In 
this respect, Spuybroek asks us, ‘why is form?’ – if 
not for a play of limits, a threshold between objects 
and events, a machine of grace and a machine for 
grace, that we both share and shares us back to 
the world.
In retrospect, as editors of this issue of Footprint, 
we may conclude by returning to one of Adrian 
Forty’s main arguments: the claim that form 
is merely a conceptual device. What we think 
becomes evident throughout this issue is that such 
an approach to form fails to productively address the 
very complexity that form entails. In other words, by 
reducing form to just another concept, another word, 
we lose the potential to examine the actual effects 
that form had, has, and can have in both architec-
tural theories and practices. Much more than simply 
a concept, we are convinced that form – in its ambi-
guity and in the heterogeneity of all the attempts to 
approach it – stands as a shared question, one that 
brings together disciplines, schools of thought and 
define it, but rather to determine the effects and the 
limits of its actions. Such an endeavour, necessarily 
syncretic and transversal relies on a myriad minor 
questions.
Among these minor questions, Peter Bertram’s 
paper focuses on what he terms an architectural 
diagrammatic inquiry, meant to negotiate the speci-
ficity and heterogeneity of analogue and digital 
diagrams. Bertram’s reflections on the relations 
that exist between the instruments and methods we 
use to communicate our ideas, and the way those 
instruments and methods determine architectural 
form, are shared by Jack Rees and Duygu Tüntaş 
alike. Together, these papers confront the question 
‘how is form?’ and further problematise it. While 
Rees advocates for a pedagogy of architecture that 
transcends our perspectival understanding of form, 
Tüntaş discusses organisational network diagrams 
as valuable instruments for the appraisal of inten-
tionality in the production of form. Jointly – although 
to different degrees – these contributions suggest a 
radical revision of both the ontology of architecture 
and of the role of the architect. 
Following a different approach, Armando Rabaça 
and Carlos Moura Martins explore the relation 
between urban and architectural form based on a 
rigorous study of big and complex buildings. While 
their study remains focused on well-known exam-
ples of twentieth century European architecture and 
urban planning, Johan Nielsen, Kris Scheerlinck 
and Yves Schoonjans develop a case-study that 
also negotiates contemporary urban and architec-
tural form, but contemplates the possibility of that 
negotiation taking place between several contexts. A 
sociology of engagement – these authors claim – is 
a valuable instrument to describe the remote produc-
tion of relatively equipotent architectural forms. Both 
of these contributions, despite their differences, 
wish to examine the questions ‘when and where is 
(urban) form?’ thus complementing and enhancing 
the previous morphogenetic accounts.
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variant methodological practices. Consequently, 
the contribution of this issue of Footprint to current 
formal studies in architecture is to problematise 
the question of form, by offering a transversal view 
among several different formalisms.
This view, we hope, should afford the production 
of theoretical, methodological and conceptual inno-
vations in the field of formal studies. Furthermore, 
it seems to already explore novel trajectories that 
try to bind different kinds of formalisms, rather than 
separating them. Finally, we are inclined to believe 
that the shared view of architectural form which we 
provide here does not obey to the constraints of any 
given formalism but, on the contrary, turns those 
constraints into productive chances for a formalism 
yet-to-come. In this sense, Bateson’s contradictory 
response to his daughter might start to become 
clearer.
D: I don’t know, Daddy. You tell me. Which do I  
 mean?
F: I don’t know, my dear. There was a very angry  
 artist once who scribbled all sorts of things   
 down, and after he was dead they looked in his 
 books and in one place they found he’d written  
 “Wise men see outlines and therefore they   
 draw them” but in another place he’d   
 written “Mad men see outlines and therefore  
 they draw them.” 18
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